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Abstract	
 
Presenting natural frequencies facilitates Bayesian inferences compared to using percentages.  
Nevertheless, many people, including highly educated and skilled reasoners, still fail to provide 
Bayesian responses on these computationally simple problems. We show that the complexity of 
relational reasoning (e.g. structural mapping between presented and requested relations), can 
help explain remaining difficulties.  With a non-Bayesian inference which required identical 
arithmetic but afforded more direct structural mapping, performance was universally high. 
Furthermore, reducing the relational demands of the task with questions which directed reasoners 
to use the presented statistics, compared with questions which prompted the representation of a 
second, similar sample, significantly improved reasoning.  Distinct error patterns were also 
observed between these presented- and similar-sample scenarios, which suggested differences in 
relational reasoning strategies. On the other hand, hile higher numeracy was associated with 
better Bayesian reasoning, higher numerate reasoners were not immune to the relational 
complexity of the task.  Together, these findings validate the relational reasoning view of 
Bayesian problem solving, and highlight the importance of considering not only the presented 
task structure, but also the complexity of the structural alignment between presented and 
requested relations. 
 
Keywords: Bayesian inference, natural frequencies, relational reasoning, numeracy, question 
form, structural mapping   
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1. Introduction 
 
 Educated adults are notoriously poor Bayesian reasoners with explicit numerical 
information (for recent review see Johnson & Tubau, 2015).  While presenting statistical 
information as natural frequencies is the most widely agreed facilitator of Bayesian inferences 
(Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), many reasoners still fail to solve these problems. Why does 
Bayesian-like reasoning remain so difficult, even after providing reasoners natural frequencies? 
In this paper we address this question by viewing Bayesian reasoning as a case of relational 
reasoning, which requires the comparison of role-based structural relations across multiple 
mental representations (Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998, 2010; Holyoak, 2012). 
 
The medical diagnosis problem represents a typical Bayesian reasoning task (Table 1). In 
this problem, information is presented regarding the base rate of having a disease and the 
likelihood of testing positive with a diagnostic test. As illustrated in Figure 1, this information 
can be represented structurally as a series of nested sets. From this information, the standard 
Bayesian question—(H|D)—asks reasoners to compute the expected number of infected people 
(the hypothesis, H) given a positive test result (the data, D). The solution, given natural 
frequencies, can be represented with the Bayesian equation: 
 
ሺܪ|ܦሻ 	ൌ ሺܪ&ܦሻሺܦሻ ൌ
ሺܪ&ܦሻ
ሺܪ&ܦሻ ൅ ሺ൓ܪ&ܦሻ ൌ
16
16 ൅ 24 ൌ "16	݋ݑݐ	݋݂	40" 
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Problem Data: 
  A screening test is being studied to detect the presence of a new virus.  The test is not perfect, 
however, as can be seen in the following data: 
 
[100 people participated in the study:] 20 of them were infected with the virus, and 80 were not 
infected.  Among those infected with the virus, 16 had a positive reaction to the test.  Among the 
people not infected with the virus, 24 also had a positive reaction to the test.    
   
 Questions: 
  p(D): Total Data
 
p(H|D): Bayes  
 
Similar‐
Sample 
Imagine the test is given to a new group of (100)
people with similar characteristics to the study 
above.  Among all of the people who participate in 
the study, how many of them would you expect to 
have a positive reaction to the test?  __ out of __ 
(Imagine the test is given to a new group of 100 
people with similar characteristics to the study 
above.)  Among those who have a positive 
reaction to the test, how many would you 
expect to be infected?  __ out of __ 
 
Presented‐
Sample 
 
Among all of the people who participated in the 
study, how many of them had a positive reaction 
to the test?  __ out of __ 
 
 
Among those people who had a positive 
reaction to the test, how many of them were 
actually infected?  __ out of __ 
   
Solutions:   
 
 
“(16+24) out of 100” “16 out of (16+24) 
 
Table 1. Study 1 was a between‐subject design, with each participant answering one of the four 
questions.  Study 2 used a within‐subject design, with each participant sequentially answering the p(D) 
and then p(H|D) questions in either the similar‐ or presented‐sample framing. In study 2, the phrase in 
[brackets] was replaced with: “Among the people who participated in the study,” and the information in 
(parentheses) was completely removed from the problem. 
 
Intense theoretical debate persists regarding the mechanism with which natural 
frequencies facilitate performance over, for example, percentage formats (Barbey & Sloman, 
2007; Brase & Hill, 2015). The most widely held view is some form of the nested sets theory. 
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While details vary among theorizers, this view is characterized by two primary claims: (1) 
making transparent the nested partition structure of a problem facilitates Bayesian reasoning, and 
(2) this facilitation arises out of a general reasoning mechanism operating over transparent set 
relations (e.g. Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Lesage, Navarrete, & De Neys, 2013; Sirota et al., 2014). 
While we generally agree with both claims, the nature of these set reasoning mechanisms has yet 
to be clearly described (see Mandel, 2007), and no paper has directly addressed the difficulties 
that remain after problem structures have been made “transparent” with natural frequencies. We 
argue that the main remaining difficulty is the misalignment of the relational roles between 
presented and requested data. 
 
On our account, Bayesian reasoning can be understood as a special case of relational 
reasoning, which depends on understanding role-based structural relations (Gentner & Markman, 
1997; Halford et al, 1998, 2010; Holyoak, 2012). Most reasoning errors arise from making 
superficial associations at the expense of understanding structural relations. For example, a 
common response to the above Bayesian question (p(H|D) in Table 1) is the hit rate (16 out of 
20), which might arise from a direct association of common concepts in presented and requested 
relations (e.g. being infected, testing positive).  Accurately carrying out the more complex 
Bayesian inference requires not only understanding the surface similarity of these elements, but 
also understanding the specific roles these categories play within a specified relation (e.g. 
reference class, focus subset; see Figure 1). Hence, an implication of the relational reasoning 
framework is that the fit of the structural alignment between the information presented in the text 
and requested in the question should predict reasoning performance (for extended discussion see 
Gentner & Markman, 1997; also Johnson & Tubau, 2015).  
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FIGURE 1. The information is Table 1 represented structurally as a series of nested set relations. (A) The 
structure of the presented information and relations to the Bayesian equation. (B) The requested 
relations needed to solve the p(D) and p(H|D) questions in studies 1 and 2. The relational roles played 
by the different elements (e.g. H, D) are illustrated with solid lines (= reference class) and dotted lines 
(= focal subset). Note that H and ¬H play both roles in the presented data. In p(D) relational roles 
remain the same between presented and requested data, while they are misaligned with the p(H|D) 
question. H = infected; ¬H = not infected; H&D = infected and test positive; ¬H&D = not infected and test 
positive; SoS = superordinate set. 
 
 
(A) 
 
 
(B) 
 
 
p(D): Total Data 
 
 
P(H|D): Bayes 
Study 1: 
 
  
 
 
Study 2: 
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Alignment Hypothesis 
 
 
From the perspective of relational reasoning, solving the Bayesian question would be 
difficult due to the change in the relational role of the subsets required to compute the reference 
class. That is, the new reference class—(D, ‘all positive tests’)—must be computed from 
previously presented focal subsets (H&D = ‘positive among infected’ and ¬H&D = ‘positive 
among not infected’), from which the new focal subset (H&D) is selected (see Figure 1). Some 
studies have suggested that people do not understand that they must use both the focal (H&D) 
and alternative (¬H&D) hypotheses to compute the relevant reference class of the posterior ratio 
(D), where people tend to neglect the alternative hypothesis (see Evans et al, 2000; Girotto & 
Gonzalez, 2001; Krynski & Tenenbaum, 2007).  Based on the relational reasoning approach, we 
hypothesized that the difficulty computing (D) is specific to its different role in the Bayesian 
relation (as reference class) relative to its role in the presented relations (as a pair focal subsets) 
rather than to the computation of (D) itself  (alignment hypothesis). 
 
To test this hypothesis, we created a non-Bayesian condition—total data question, 
p(D)—that required identical arithmetic as the Bayesian question, but where the elements (e.g. 
positive tests) played the same relational roles as in the presented data (Table 1).  In this 
condition, the required reference class was the superordinate set (SoS) of the problem, while the 
new focal subset required the summing of two initial focal subsets (the frequencies 
corresponding to H&D + ¬H&D). Accordingly, the p(D) question also provides a control of 
participants’ ability to select the particular subsets needed to compute the posterior reference 
class. The required computations are illustrated in the equation: 
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ሺܦሻ 	ൌ ሺܦሻሺܵ݋ܵሻ ൌ
ሺܪ&ܦሻ ൅ ሺ൓ܪ&ܦሻ
ሺܵ݋ܵሻ ൌ
16 ൅ 24
100 ൌ "40	݋ݑݐ	݋݂	100" 
 
 
Sample-Type Hypothesis 
 
 
 In addition to the mapping complexity between presented and requested relations, typical 
Bayesian tasks request participants to reason over a new, unspecified sample similar to the one 
presented (see Table 1, “similar-sample questions”). This requires the reasoner to infer the new 
statistics based on the presented statistics prior to carrying out the Bayesian inference. A series of 
informal observations in pilot studies in our lab suggested that simply asking participants to base 
their answer on the presented data greatly facilitated Bayesian responses. From the relational 
reasoning account, a question prompting a reasoner to imagine a similar sample would increase 
processing demand due to the need to maintain different samples (the presented sample, and the 
imagined similar sample) in order to infer the corresponding statistics. Likewise, instructing 
participants to base their answer on the presented data would facilitate exact Bayesian responses 
by eliminating the need to construct a second representation and perform the corresponding 
mapping. We test this sample-type hypothesis by directly instructing participants to reason over 
the sample of individuals presented in the text (presented-sample question) or over a new, similar 
sample of individuals (similar-sample question) (Table 1).  
  
Alternatively, asking to imagine a similar sample might lead participants to base 
responses on an approximation or a compute-then-adjust strategy to accommodate the “similar” 
sample. In this case, more approximate estimations should be observed in the responses to both 
Bayesian and non-Bayesian questions. However, if, as suggested above, imagining a similar 
Page 8 of 22Psychonomic Bulletin & Review submission
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
9 
 
 
 
sample hampered performance due to increased relational reasoning demand, this effect should 
be stronger for the more complex Bayesian question. To distinguish between these possibilities, 
error analyses were used to gain insight into the processing strategies that individuals were 
engaging. Given that these hypothesized effects might also be moderated by individual skills, we 
measured participants’ level of numeracy, commonly observed to influence probabilistic 
reasoning performance (e.g. Johnson & Tubau, 2013; McNair & Feeney, 2015). 
 
2. Study 1 
 
 In study 1 we used a between-participant design to test the sample-type hypothesis—that 
Bayesian performance can be improved by instructing reasoners to use the data presented in the 
problem versus imaging a new similar sample—and the alignment hypothesis—that even with 
identical numerical computations requested from identically presented data, a specific difficulty 
will be observed with the Bayesian logic. 
 
2.1. Method & Material	
 
Based on an a priori power calculation to detect a medium sized effect (w=0.4), we aimed to 
include at least 60 participants for each condition (a conservative estimate considering previous 
research; e.g. McNair & Feeney, 2015; Sirota et al, 2014, 2015).  Participants were 319 
undergraduates from the University of Barcelona who had yet to receive instruction in Bayesian 
reasoning.  Informed consent was collected and students received course credit for their 
participation.  All participants received the virus test scenario and either the p(D) or p(H|D) 
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question referring to either an imagined similar sample or the presented sample shown in Table 
1.  Following this, participants completed the 11-item Lipkus et al (2001) numeracy scale. 
Calculators were not allowed.   
 
2.2. Results 
 
 Nine participants were removed from the study for indicating they had previously seen this 
type of problem or for not completing the task as requested.  Results are therefore reported for 
the remaining 310 participants (mean age = 21.4, SD = 1.6). The mean numeracy score was 8.65 
(median = 9, range = 3-11, SD = 1.86). 
 
Reasoning Accuracy.  Global results are summarized in Figure 2.  Only exact Bayesian answers 
were counted as correct.  A logistic regression was performed using the dichotomous coding of 
response (correct, incorrect) as the dependent variable, with the question (p(H|D), p(D)), sample 
type (similar, presented), and continuous numeracy score entered as predictors. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of correct responses with similar vs. presented sample questions, with the 
alignment manipulation, p(D) vs. p(H|D), as (A) between‐subject in study 1, and (B) within‐subject as a 
two‐step manipulation in study 2. Error bars are standard errors. 
 
 
 Results revealed a significant main effect of sample type, χ²(1) = 12.36, p < .001, eβ = 2.90, 
95% C.I. = 1.60 – 5.24, showing facilitated performance when the question directed reasoners to 
use the specific data presented in the problem.  There was also a significant effect of question, 
χ²(1) = 50.92, p < .001, eβ = 11.22, 95% C.I. = 5.77 – 21.79, with ceiling performance observed 
with the p(D) question.  Finally, as illustrated in Figure 3A, a significant effect of numeracy was 
also observed, χ²(1) = 14.65, p < .001, eβ = 1.37, 95% C.I. = 1.17 – 1.61, with higher numerate 
individuals better with both presented and similar scenarios.  There were no significant 
interactions (all ps >.20).   
 
  
Figure 3. Performance with the Bayesian p(H|D) question according to numeracy score (A) in study 1, 
and (B) in study 2 with a two‐step manipulation. 
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Error Analysis.  Table 2 reports observed errors on the p(H|D) question.  Errors in the similar-
sample condition were widely distributed, however, over half of errors contained the 
superordinate value ‘100’ as the reference class.  In the presented-sample condition, less than a 
third of all errors contained ‘100’.  This difference in responses containing ‘100’ was significant, 
χ²(N=153) = 11.47, p < .001, φ = .27.  Furthermore, in the similar-sample scenario only a few  
hit-rate-only responses were observed, whereas this was the most frequent error in the presented-
sample scenario, χ²(N=153) = 5.91, p = .015, φ = .20 (see Table 2). 
 
St.  Sample Type  (n) 
Bayes 
(16/40) 
Pre‐Bayes
(20/40) 
HR
(16/20) 
BR
(20/100) 
Joint 
(16/100) 
100‐othr
(xx/100)  Other 
1  Similar  (69)  36  10  3  12  6  17  16 
Present  (84)  61  4  14  2  2  7  10 
2  Similar (2‐stp)  (63)  59  8  8  3  6  5  11 
Present  (2‐stp)  (60)  80  2  12  0  2  0  4 
 
Table 2. Percentages of responses observed with the posterior p(H|D) question in studies (St.) 1 and 2.  
Bayes = exact Bayesian solution (H&D out of D); Pre‐Bayes = correct denominator but selecting all of 
infected as numerator (H out of D). HR = hit rate (H&D out of H); BR = base rate (H out of 100); Joint = 
joint occurrence (H&D out of 100); 100‐othr = other numerators paired with superordinate set as 
denominator (xx out of 100). 
 
 
Discussion.  Results of this study supported the two primary hypotheses.  First, we obtained an 
alignment effect: significantly better performance when the relational roles in the presented and 
requested set-subset data were aligned.  Second, we observed a sample-type effect: improved 
performance by instructing participants to reason over the data presented in the problem 
(presented-sample question) compared with a similar sample of individuals (similar-sample 
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question). The ceiling performance with the p(D) question, requiring the same computations as 
the more complex p(H|D) question, indicates that difficulties determining the Bayesian reference 
class (the total set of positive tests) are specific to its particular role in the posterior ratio. Errors 
analyses suggested that the lower performance in the similar sample scenario was not simply 
caused by more approximate reasoning strategies, since this would have also reduced exact 
responses in the p(D) question. Nevertheless, a large number of responses in the similar-sample 
scenario contained the value ‘100’. The presence of this value in the presented data and in the 
similar-sample scenario questions (see Table 1) could have both hampered the difficult question 
and enhanced the easier one. Study 2 attempted to solve this issue. 
 
3. Study 2 
 
 In this study we provide a more stringent test of the sample-type and alignment hypotheses. 
As commented above, the inclusion of the ‘100’ both in the data and in the question of the 
similar-sample scenario  may have both interfered with the selection of relevant information for 
the p(H|D) question, and also facilitated performance for p(D), which together would undermine 
the observed alignment effect, in addition to weakening the sample-type effect.  Therefore, in 
this study we removed all references to the superordinate set value ‘100’ from the problem text 
and question. This both removed irrelevant information from the p(H|D) problem, and added an 
additional arithmetic step to the p(D) question (Figure 2). We also adopted a two-step design 
where participants were sequentially presented the p(D) and p(H|D) questions as a within-subject 
manipulation.   
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 We again expected near-ceiling performance with the initial p(D) question.  We hypothesized 
that these manipulations would facilitate Bayesian responding in both similar- and presented-
sample conditions.  A significant sample-type effect under these highly facilitatory conditions 
would be clear evidence that reasoning over similar samples requires additional processing 
compared to reasoning over presented samples.   
 
3.1. Method & Materials 
 
 A new sample of 123 undergraduate students (mean age = 21.2, SD = 1.4) completed the 
p(D) question followed by p(H|D), both with either presented-sample or similar-sample framing, 
and also the numeracy scale.  The alignment manipulation was therefore within-participant, 
while the sample-type manipulation was between-participant. All explicit mentions of ‘100’ were 
removed from the problem as indicated in Table 1. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
Reasoning Accuracy.  Global results are shown in Figure 2B.  The mean numeracy score was 
8.76 (median = 9, range = 3-11, SD = 1.71).  With the p(D) question, ceiling performance was 
again observed with both sample-type scenarios, and a logistic regression run on this first step 
showed no differences between sample type, numeracy scores, and no interaction, all χ² (1) < 
1.5, ps > .25.  In contrast, a logistic regression on the p(H|D) response revealed significant main 
effects of both sample type, χ² (1) = 6.91, p = .009, eβ = .31, 95% C.I. = .13 – .74, and numeracy, 
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χ² (1) = 11.27,  p= .001, eβ = 1.54, 95% C.I. = 1.20 – 1.98 (Figure 3B).  The interaction was not 
significant, χ² (1) < 1, p > .75. 
 
 A within-subject McNemar’s test also confirmed an alignment effect with both the presented-
sample, McNemar χ²(N=60) = 9.0, p = .004, φ = .46, and similar-sample, McNemar χ²(N=63) = 
17.64 9, p < .001, φ = .11, scenarios.  To further explore this effect according to numeracy level, 
a median split was used to separate participants into higher and lower numeracy groups.  For 
lower numerate individuals, a significant alignment effect was observed for both the similar-
sample, McNemar χ²(N=27) = 13.00, p < .001,  φ= .29, and presented-sample, McNemar 
χ²(N=22) = 6.00, p = .031, φ = .32, scenarios.  For higher numerate reasoners, the alignment 
effect just reached significance with the similar-sample scenario, McNemar χ²(N=36) = 5.33, p = 
.039,  φ= .15, however, it disappeared in the presented-sample condition, McNemar χ²(N=38) = 
3.00, p = .25.   
 
Error Analysis.  Globally, the most common errors paralleled those found in the previous study 
(Table 2).  In particular, although errors with the similar-sample condition were widely 
distributed, the use of ‘100’ as the reference class was still more frequent than with the 
presented-sample scenario, χ²(N=123) = 6.55, p = .010, φ = .23.  Also as before, most of the 
errors in the presented-sample scenario corresponded to the hit rate (58% of errors,  vs. 14% of 
errors with the similar-sample condition; χ²(N=38) = 5.81, p = .016,  φ= .39). 
 
Discussion.  The present study provides additional support for the sample-type effect. Even with 
two-step questions which guide reasoners through the necessary computations, instructing 
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reasoners to use the presented data still facilitated Bayesian responses compared with similar 
samples. As discussed below, error analysis also suggested that the presented-sample enhanced 
the mapping between presented and requested relations. Nevertheless, an alignment effect was 
still observed for individuals lower in numeracy. Confirming previous findings, almost all 
participants in both conditions could use the presented information to accurately compute the 
total number of positive tests using the hit rate and false-positive rate, but many of them still 
failed to use this computation as the reference class for the Bayesian ratio.  Together, this 
indicates a specific difficulty with the structural mapping required to supply the Bayesian 
response. 
 
4. General Discussion 
 
 In these studies we asked why Bayesian-like reasoning remains so difficult even after 
clarifying the nested set structure of the problems with natural frequencies.  On our account, 
statistical word problems require a type of relational reasoning, and therefore performance 
should be influenced by the relational complexity of the task. Solving the Bayesian p(H|D) 
question requires realizing that the relational roles of specific subsets presented in the text are 
changed in the question. With the non-Bayesian p(D) question, on the other hand, the relational 
roles of focal and references class are maintained between the presented and the requested 
information, providing a more direct structural mapping.  Accordingly, compared to the p(D) 
question, the p(H|D) inference requires an added level of abstraction to notice that the relational 
role is not fixed and can vary with the form of the question. 
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 The observed sample-type effect is also consistent with the relational reasoning account, 
providing clear evidence that there is a cost when people are instructed to reason over a similar 
sample compared to when instructions direct reasoners to use the presented data.  Of interest, 
however, the similar-sample framing did not significantly impair reasoning with the p(D) 
question in study 2, and this was the case even with the added arithmetic step in this condition.  
This suggests that the misalignment between presented and requested relations is the primary 
relational burden for the Bayesian inference, which is made more complex with the added 
processing demands of the similar-sample question.  
 
 Error analyses revealed that the poorer performance in the similar-sample condition did not 
stem from a shift in strategy, but rather from a confusion in the text comprehension process 
and/or processing interference during the mapping from presented to similar sample. Analysis of 
the ‘other’ responses argued against the possibility that reasoners were using estimation 
strategies or computing the Bayesian response and then adjusting slightly for possible 
uncertainties in the newly imagined sample (compute-then-adjust strategy). The fact that 
virtually all participants answered p(D) with exactly “40 out of 100” also demonstrates that the 
similar-sample questions do not inherently invoke estimation or compute-then-adjust strategies.  
It might also be suggested that the prevalence of the superordinate value ‘100’ indicates that 
participants are attempting to normalize responses.  A careful review of protocols, however, 
argued against this possibility, with most of these responses showing drawn arrows or circles 
around the “100” in the text, or a simple summing of 80+20, rather than normalization 
procedures.  Furthermore, the ‘100’ in the denominator was roughly equally paired with numbers 
presented in or directly derived from the text (16, 20, 40), making the normalization explanation 
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or the estimation strategy less likely. While these patterns indicate that the error variability did 
not result from the application of estimation strategies or normalization procedures, future 
studies could look to more carefully specify the type of processing burden driving this effect.   
  
 As predicted, there were fewer overall errors with the presented-sample scenarios, most of 
which were the hit-rate, or inverse fallacy (Villejoubert & Mandel, 2002).  The hit rate might be 
explained by superficial strategies such as label matching (Evans, 1998) or, more specifically, by 
confusing the structural roles (reference class and focal subset) during the mapping between 
presented and requested relations (Holyoak & Koh, 1987).  That is, participants might make the 
less effortful direct mapping between elements in the question and presented text (infected-
positive) rather than the more demanding mapping requiring consideration of the relevant 
relational roles (total positiveinfected).  Hence, the more straightforward relational mapping 
promoted by the presented-sample scenario can explain both the increment of correct responses 
and the most frequent error found in this scenario. 
 
 Much work has gone into understanding why natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian 
performance. We were motivated by the general claims and empirical support for the nested sets 
theory to further explore why natural frequencies still remain so difficult for so many reasoners. 
Previous work has looked at both the phrasing of the presented information (e.g. Krynski and 
Tenenbaum, 2007; McNair& Feeney, 2015) and the form of the question (e.g. Girotto & 
Gonzalez, 2001; Pighin et al, 2015), but no study has specifically looked at the role-based 
structural compatibility explored in the present study. One recent proposal by Ayal and Beyth-
Marom (2014) looked  at the “compatibility” of presented and requested relations, however, their 
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compatibility manipulations looked specifically at numerical aspects (formats, sample sizes), not 
structural compatibility. They also reported an effect of “mental steps” referring to the number of 
explicit calculations needed to solve the problem. In our work, p(D) and p(H|D) require the same 
number of numerical steps, and therefore our alignment effect demonstrates an additional burden 
not tied to explicit numerical transformations, namely, the relational reasoning required to map 
the misaligned structures. We believe the natural frequency format enhances relational reasoning 
(see also DeWolf, Bassok, Holyoak, 2015). However, we also make the stronger claim that 
problems using percentages could also be viewed as relational reasoning tasks requiring the 
alignment of role-based structured relations, in addition to the corresponding numerical 
transformations. Accordingly, the relational reasoning framework predicts that similar alignment 
effects should be observable in Bayesian problems using percentage formats. Future studies 
could test this hypothesis. 
 
 To conclude, while natural frequencies have been hailed as a facilitator of Bayesian 
inferences for twenty years now (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), the fact that performance on 
these problems still remains so low has been little discussed.  The present studies offer an 
explanation for this difficulty by viewing Bayesian word problems as a case of relational 
reasoning, which requires the comparison of structural relationships across different level of 
abstraction.      
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